

## UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—Confirmed by the Senate on January 21, Dean Rusk came to the post of Secretary of State after a long career in international relations. During World War II he had served as deputy chief of staff for the China-Burma-India theater. In 1946 he joined the State Department as assistant chief of the Division of International Security Affairs. From there he became special assistant to Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and in 1947 he returned to the State Department as director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, which later became the Office of United Nations Affairs. In 1949 he was appointed Deputy Under Secretary of State and the next year was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, during which time he was deeply involved in policies relating to Korea, Japan and China. From 1952 until 1960, Rusk served as president of the Rockefeller Foundation.]

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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1961

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Newhouse, of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have our new Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk. The members will remember that, although Secretary Rusk appeared before us in connection with his nomination, he has not had an opportunity to discuss with us some of the foreign policy problems that have occupied his constant attention since he assumed office.

The Secretary last week suggested to me that it might be helpful to him and to us if we met together in executive session.

I want to remind all the members that this session is executive in nature, and I am sure the Secretary's desires to be candid have a direct relationship to his confidence that this testimony will not become public. It is very embarrassing both to the committee and to the Secretary when leaks from these meetings get into the press.

It is very difficult to know, however, what to say when we are through here. As the Secretary knows, there is a great problem to keep it general enough not to be embarrassing, and yet it is almost impossible for us not to give something. The custom in the past has been, on things that are really sensitive, if we could agree together, to put out a short statement for the press.

Senator MORSE. You get them to working under the United Nations. You can use Belgian civilians, but we have to get them working under the United Nations auspices.

Secretary RUSK. I see.

Senator MORSE. Then you can get some Congolese to accept them. But what they are afraid of is that this is all a phony. This independence was inevitable, so the Belgians are now using this chaos to fasten an even greater economic grip on the Congo. I think there is some need for very direct and straight talking with the Belgians on the part of the United Nations and Great Britain and the United States for Belgium to stop some of these economic policies in the Congo.

I spoke, while you were out of the room, Senator Fulbright, and I said you and I had the opportunity to hear a great international industrialist whose name remains undisclosed, who talked the other night in Hamilton, Bermuda, when we argued the problem. The suggestion was that steps ought to be taken to try to widen our base here and have Belgian interests taken over, with adequate compensation, by industrialists from many countries, and establish a sort of consortium there, rather than leave these controls of natural resources in the hands of Belgian monopolies. That is the source of great trouble for years and years to come.

#### U.N. ADMINISTRATION IS SOUND IDEA

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think this notion of getting the United Nations into a position of administrative responsibility for the public services of the country for a period is very sound. It is something that we are pushing and working toward because there is no substitute.

Now, within the U.N. framework we had supposed a considerable number of these Belgians could be used. I do not know where we would get it otherwise.

Senator MORSE. You can do it under the U.N. flag, but not under—

Secretary RUSK. You see we could not use the word "trusteeship."

Senator MORSE. You are too late for that. It is just a sad, tragic thing for 10 years. We ought to have had it established 5 years ago.

Secretary RUSK. But de facto it might work.

Senator MORSE. I think you ought to take a long look at Ruanda-Urundi for some kind of U.N. control before the holocaust breaks, because I happen to believe they are more warlike, they are better fighters, and they are a little more advanced. From all we can gather last fall, they are much more bitter than the Congolese toward the Belgians. They just hate them.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I did not mean to make a speech.

Secretary RUSK. I appreciate your remarks.

Senator MORSE. But I want to say that I did not think it too late to get more United Nations influence in there. I do think we have to stop strengthening the Belgians' hands.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

## IMPORTANCE OF ACTIONS BY U.S. BUSINESSES

**Senator GORE.** Mr. Secretary, time being so short, I would like to make one brief observation. From a weekend in Mexico I gained the very firm impression, although one cannot become an expert on a country—or maybe you can—in a couple of days. But rightly or wrongly I gained the impression that the Mexican people tended to equate their own revolution with the Cuban revolution. We are involved in that because their own revolution was not only against oppressive dictatorship, but against exploitation of the resources and the people of Mexico by absentee landlords, United States monopoly business interests for whom they considered Diaz a lackey. They look upon Batista as a counterpart to, or parallel to, Diaz.<sup>8</sup>

Just as Senator Hickenlooper found the leading intelligentsia whispering things against Castro, the base of sympathy for the revolution is so deep among the populace that no one is willing to say anything publicly.

I do not know to what extent this exists throughout Latin America, but because of things I saw there and have seen in other countries, I think we have one overall problem which I would like to state to you, and that is to require our own citizens and our own business interests to conform their actions in foreign countries to the foreign policy objectives and the national interests of the United States. Some of them are goodwill ambassadors, but the freebooters who go in to make a killing quickly build a great enmity toward this country.

I could question you at some length and give you some details. I will not because of the time situation.

## REEXAMINATION OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

I did want to ask one question about this question of nuclear policy. Nine years ago I was the first Member of the Senate to make a speech challenging the wisdom and the efficacy of the new look or massive retaliation of major dependence upon nuclear weapons. I thought it was unwise. I still do.

But we have proceeded to that course. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has recently filed a report. I do not know whether you have had a chance to see it.

**Secretary RUSK.** Yes.

**Senator GORE.** It is on nuclear weapons and their manner of handling by our NATO allies and by NATO itself.

Have you had an opportunity to see that?

**Secretary RUSK.** I have not studied the full report. I have studied a digest on it. I had a report on it and will be doing it this week, as a matter of fact.

**Senator GORE.** Well, suffice it to say we have the bilateral with Italy before this committee, and the story published about your views certainly complicates that. I am not at all unsympathetic with the necessity of a thorough reexamination or our nuclear weapons policy. This committee is entitled to the information, so I do not know why I should not say that we have in Italy the war-

<sup>8</sup> Porfirio Diaz, Mexican dictator, 1876-1909; Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, Cuban dictator, 1934-59.

heads already attached to the missiles pointed toward the Soviet Union, and we are moving to do the same thing in Turkey, where they have had two coup d'etats in the last 2 years.

This is the kind of provocation which needs to be considered very carefully. I wonder what our attitude would be if warheads should be attached to missiles in Cuba.

So, I am not unsympathetic with the reexamination of this policy. But, Mr. Secretary, I cannot emphasize how strongly I feel that we cannot suddenly throw away the one weapon we have and start looking for our bows and arrows. We have disintegrated our conventional military forces, and to try to depend upon that alone would leave not only us but our national interest and our allies in an utterly indefensible position and a weakened position.

Because of the time element, I have made a statement rather than asking a question, but I would like to have an answer.

#### UNITED STATES IS NOT GIVING UP ANYTHING

**Secretary RUSK.** Senator, were you here when I discussed these releases?

**Senator GORE.** Yes; I was.

**Secretary RUSK.** I do not have any notion that the United States is expected to throw away its nuclear armaments. It is of the most vital importance that we keep our—

**Senator GORE.** I was speaking figuratively there.

**Secretary RUSK.** Yes. I had not supposed that anyone in a responsible position was thinking about giving up our nuclear weapons, our nuclear capabilities. This is of the utmost importance.

What is under discussion is our national and our NATO strategic doctrines, particularly on the plane of flexibility of forces, that is, the flexibility of means in dealing with different situations.

The problem in a story of that sort is that it leaves the impression that we are giving up something. Well, that is why I said such a story is so damaging.

**Senator GORE.** It leaves the impression that you are renouncing the use to meet circumstances for which you have no other means of meeting now; that is the impression that is left unfortunately.

Do you agree on that?

**Secretary RUSK.** That is the impression that is left, but that is not—that does not derive from any decisions or doctrines that have been responsibly talked about. This is an inaccurate bit of reporting.

**Senator GORE.** I understood you to say that.

**Secretary RUSK.** You see.

#### NECESSITY OF INCREASING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

**Senator SYMINGTON.** Senator, would you yield for a question pertinent to your point?

**Senator GORE.** I have used my time.

**Senator SYMINGTON.** Whether the story is right or not, and I am sure it is not because you say it is not, it does prove, as Senator Gore was developing it, the absolute vital necessity of increasing our conventional war capacity, does it not?

**Secretary Rusk.** Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave, and I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Gore.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator GORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

#### U.N. MEMBERSHIP FOR RED CHINA

Senator LAUSCHE. First of all, Mr. Rusk, may I state to you that I have been deeply impressed by the breadth of your knowledge of all of these problems, and I am astounded at the mental capacity which you have in calling so quickly to your tongue's tip the answers to the questions that have been put to you.

I would like to ask, having in mind that conditions may change and that our position, of necessity, may have to be changed, is there a present disposition to recognize Red China into membership in the United Nations on the part of our State Department?

Secretary Rusk. There is no disposition to believe that the admission of Peiping, as such, is in the American interest.

Now, this is not a devious or highly qualified answer. I mean the Peiping regime has made it very clear that even within the Communist bloc, it is the leader of the most aggressive wing of the Communist bloc. Unless they have perpetrated a major hoax on the rest of us, which we do not think has happened, there is serious discussion within the Communist bloc on their basic doctrine; the Peiping authorities have been the ones who have been leading the most violent wing of that discussion.

They have made it very clear in every expression that they have made, most of them public, some of them in private talks with people who have gone through there, that they will not yield at all on this issue of Formosa and the existence of a government on Formosa, and that they are not interested in membership in international organizations in which the Government of Formosa is present.

#### THE TWO-CHINA QUESTION

Senator LAUSCHE. Where will that leave us in the event the question should be presented that both Chiang Kai-shek and Peiping should have representation in the United Nations?

Secretary Rusk. The answer to that one would turn on decisions that President Kennedy has not yet made about our own attitude, but part of it is answered automatically by a parliamentary question.

We do not believe that Peiping would agree, nor would Formosa, to a so-called two-China policy. If you seat Peiping first, there is no opportunity for even working on a two-China policy. If you seat Formosa first, Peiping has declared they are not interested in accepting membership under that circumstance. In other words, I do not at the present see any present outcome on this question in the United Nations except a deadlock.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

There is no justification in inferring that Brazil and the United Kingdom, to the extent that they have spoken on the subject, have in any way been induced to do so by our Government?